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Abstract 
For a sample of 2,879 SEOs by US stocks from 1970–2004, this paper decomposes an average 
three-year post-issue buy-and-hold abnormal return of −25.9% (relative to size- and B/M-matched 
non-issuing stocks) into two components. One component, representing 41% of the total, is due to 
lower risk exposure. The second component, representing the remaining 59%, is abnormal 
performance related to the surprise element of the issue decision, which the paper attributes to 
managers’ private information that the market does not incorporate into the announcement return. 
This second component results in abnormal returns during the 16 months after the offering. 
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1. Introduction 
Seasoned equity issuers underperform benchmark stocks over the long run.1 We test the behavioral 
explanation for this finding, namely the underreaction hypothesis, which assumes that managers 
act rationally on their private information about stock overvaluation when announcing an equity 
issue. Investors underreact to the SEO announcement, stock mispricing persists at the issue date, 
and subsequent underperformance occurs as manager and investor valuations gradually converge. 
This is consistent with Loughran and Ritter’s (1995, p. 48) statement that “… our numbers imply 
that if the market fully reacted to the information implied by an equity issue announcement, the 
average announcement effect would be −33 percent, not −3 percent.” 
Our proxy for manager’s private information about stock overvaluation is the inverse Mills 
ratio (lambda) from a probit model that predicts the issue decision based on publicly available 
information. Less anticipated SEO announcements have higher surprise components, implying 
greater stock overvaluation and giving higher lambdas. The underreaction hypothesis, therefore, 
states that higher lambdas predict lower post-announcement returns as the announcement effect 
fails to fully incorporate managers’ private information.  
For a sample of 2,879 equity issues in the US over 1970–2004, we decompose an average 
three-year post-SEO buy-and-hold abnormal return of −25.9%, relative to size and book-to-market 
(size–B/M) non-issuing stocks, into two components. The first is a −15.43% abnormal return 
related to the surprise element of the equity issue decision, which we attribute to investor 
underreaction to managers’ private information revealed by the issue announcement. The second 
component of −10.44% is due to lower post-SEO risk exposure. We show that SEOs are larger, 
more liquid, with higher investment rates and B/M ratios, and lower gearing and profitability than 
                                                 
1
 The discussion of Table 1 below cites relevant evidence. 
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benchmark stocks after the offering. A detailed analysis of the underreaction to the issue shows 
that it corrects, on average, within 16 months. Thereafter, SEO returns are consistent with returns 
on similar assets. This gives a much shorter period of market correction than the five-years in 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995).   
The relation between post-issue returns and managers’ private information is robust to 
controlling for pre-issue (abnormal) return performance, SEO attrition before the end of the 
holding period, delisting returns, and hot issue periods. The results are also robust to possible 
misspecification of the empirical model that could cause estimates of managerial private 
information to include public information affecting returns over a cross-section of stocks, since we 
find no relation between our estimate of managerial private information and returns for size–B/M 
benchmarks or randomly drawn samples of non-issuing CRSP stocks.  
This study decomposes SEO post-issue performance relative to size–B/M benchmarks into 
a short-term underreaction effect and a long-run discount rate effect. We propose an unbiased and 
consistent test of the underreaction story compared to previous studies that investigate whether 
investors rationally interpret publicly available information around the equity offering. A relation 
between public information and post-issue returns could reflect a relation that affects all stocks, 
rather than an effect specific to the equity issue.2 Consequently, past studies offer weak support 
for the underreaction hypothesis. Our tests control for the discount rate hypothesis, which says that 
lower risk explains low SEO returns. We show that SEO post-issue expected return estimates are 
biased and inconsistent in the absence of a formal model of managers’ private information and 
                                                 
2
 For example, Rangan (1998) attributes low SEO post-issue returns to investor underreaction to pre-issue earnings 
management. Xie (2001), however, finds that investors overprice discretionary accruals in a cross-section of stocks 
and high discretionary accruals predict low returns over the following two years. Xie (2001, p. 359) argues that 
“[discretionary accruals] mispricing is not limited to settings that give managers opportunistic incentives to manipulate 
earnings, such as before IPOs or seasoned equity offerings”. 
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their decision to make an SEO. In contrast to some previous findings, however, we find that a 
discount rate effect alone cannot explain SEO underperformance.  
Evidence of less-than-rational investor behavior around various corporate events suggests 
that adjusting for private information should accompany any cross-sectional regression of post-
announcement returns.3 Our study has implications for related international research, since the 
literature documents SEO underperformance in non-US markets with different regulatory and 
institutional regimes and other equity flotation methods.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section reviews previous literature that 
examines the underreaction and discount rate explanations for post-SEO returns and presents our 
empirical hypothesis. Section 3 develops an econometric model to test this hypothesis. Section 4 
presents the data and we confirm previous evidence of SEO underperformance in Section 5. We 
test our hypothesis and present empirical results in Section 6. Section 7 examines the length of the 
delayed market reaction and Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Previous literature and development of the underreaction hypothesis  
Several studies document abnormally low SEO returns up to five-years after equity issues. 
Table 1 summarizes US and international evidence on long-run SEO performance using buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. Underperformance ranges from −9.0% over three years for German SEOs 
from 1960–1992 (Stehle et al., 2000) to −53.3% over three years for Canadian SEOs from 1993–
2004 (Carpentier et al., 2010) and to −59.4% over five years for US SEOs from 1970–1990 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  
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 See Subrahmanyam (2007) for a recent review of the behavioral finance literature.  
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Direct evidence on whether SEO underperformance is due to irrational investor behavior 
around equity offerings is difficult to obtain. Previous studies investigate whether investors 
rationally interpret manager and analyst actions around equity offerings. Rangan (1998), Teoh et 
al. (1998), and DuCharme et al. (2004) show that increases in pre-issue discretionary accruals 
predict post-issue returns, consistent with investors incorrectly extrapolating pre-issue earnings 
performance.4 Shivakumar (2000), however, finds that the market rationally anticipates pre-issue 
earnings management and undoes its effect at the issue announcement. He argues that test 
misspecification explains Rangan’s (1998) and Teoh et al.’s (1998) results. Jegadeesh (2000) 
suggests that investors are over-optimistic about issuers’ future earnings at the issue date and adjust 
their expectations in response to disappointing earnings results after the issue. Jegadeesh reports 
that SEOs underperform by twice as much around post-issue quarterly earnings announcements as 
outside these periods. Brous et al. (2001), however, find no evidence of abnormal returns around 
quarterly post-issue earnings announcements. As most of these studies assume investor 
underreaction to publicly available information, failing to model investor reaction to managerial 
private information may explain their different results. 
Information asymmetry between managers and investors allows managers to determine 
when the firm’s stock is overpriced and use this information in their equity issue decisions. 
Investors form expectations of the likelihood and information content of equity issues using market 
and firm-specific information available before the offering. For example, investors can use 
accounting information, news reports, and stock price movements to assess the degree of firm 
misvaluation and the likelihood of managers making an equity offering. Stock prices should 
impound this information before the issue announcement. Bayesian investors should update their 
                                                 
4
 Iqbal et al. (2009) provide corresponding evidence on earnings management before UK open offers. 
6 
 
assessment of firm value based on managers’ private information revealed by the announcement 
and stock prices should react fully and unbiasedly, so that SEOs earn normal post-issue returns. 
But if investors only partially discount the information in the issue announcement, post-issue SEO 
abnormal returns will be negative, as stock prices gradually adjust. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between investor behavior, managers’ private information, 
and SEO stock price. Figure 1a shows the evolution of SEO stock price around the announcement 
if investors are rational. Investors predict an equity issue and impound the anticipated issue effect 
into the stock price before the announcement.5 On announcement, investors fully discount 
managers’ private information and there is no long-run abnormal SEO performance. Figure 1b 
shows the SEO price path when investors partially discount managers’ private information at the 
announcement date. Stock price fully impounds the signal over a post-issue period, leading to SEO 
underperformance, consistent with the underreaction hypothesis.6 Once the stock price fully 
impounds the signal, SEO returns reflect post-issue risk. Figure 1 shows that testing the 
underreaction hypothesis is equivalent to testing for a significant negative relation between 
managers’ private information and post-issue SEO buy-and-hold returns. 
The underreaction hypothesis: lower post-issue SEO stock returns are associated with 
greater managerial private information revealed by the SEO announcement. 
The underreaction hypothesis contrasts with the discount rate hypothesis, which says that 
reduced risk exposure explains low SEO returns. Eckbo et al. (2000) argue that SEO firms have 
lower leverage than size–B/M benchmarks, which reduces their risk exposure to unexpected 
inflation, the default spread, and changes in the slope of the term structure. Eckbo and Norli (2005) 
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 For simplicity, Figure 1 ignores SEO price run-up before the issue announcement.  
6
 Although the SEO announcement reveals managers’ private information, empirical studies measure long-run SEO 
abnormal performance relative to the issue date. We follow this convention for comparability with previous studies.  
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show that a liquidity-augmented Carhart (1997) model explains SEO five-year post-issue returns 
in calendar time. Lyandres et al. (2008) argue that firms raise equity to convert risky growth 
options into fixed assets, which lowers risk. They document that three-year post-issue returns load 
negatively on an investment factor, which explains their post-issue performance.  
The evidence that reduced risk explains low SEO returns comes from calendar time 
analysis, which may have lower power to detect abnormal returns than event time analysis. 
Simulating events with more severe misvaluations in small stocks and high-volume periods, 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) report that Fama–French three-factor calendar time regressions capture 
only 50% of true abnormal returns, compared with 80% for event time buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns relative to size–B/M benchmarks. Ang and Zhang (2004) find in simulations that the power 
of Fama–French three-factor calendar time regressions “decreases sharply as event horizon 
increases” (p. 255).  
 
3. A model of long-run SEO abnormal returns when mispricing causes the event  
This section develops a model of long-run SEO abnormal returns when managers time issues of 
mispriced equity, investors underreact to the information revealed by the issue announcement, and 
the stock price fully impounds the information over a post-issue period. We start by describing the 
traditional estimator of abnormal returns when the source of abnormal performance is unknown. 
We call this the unconditional estimator of SEO abnormal return. To capture investor 
underreaction to managers’ private information and prices impounding the information over a 
post-issue period, we then propose a conditional abnormal return estimator.  
 
3.1. The unconditional estimator of SEO abnormal returns 
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A typical event study compares the return performance of an event firm to a counterfactual 
benchmark. To model this formally, consider issuing firm i ’s post-event return, 1iR , in excess of 
the risk free rate, fR , as a function of systematic risk, iX , a firm specific component, 1iu , and an 
event induced stock price reaction, 1d , where subscript 1 indicates the act of issuing. Similarly, 
the counterfactual return for SEO firm i, 0iR , in excess of the risk free rate, fR , is a function of 
risk, iX , a firm specific component, 0iu , and a non-event related performance, 0d , where subscript 
0 indicates the act of not issuing. The counterfactual state is the hypothetical state in which an 
equity issuer chooses not to issue, and the event window that defines 1iR
 
and 0iR  usually spans 
three to five years. Two outcome equations give the post-event expected returns 
1 1 1 1( ) ( )   i f i i iE R R X d X E u   for firm i in the act of issuing    (1) 
 0 0 0 0( ) ( )i f i i iE R R X d X E u     for firm i in the act of not issuing   (2) 
The unconditional issue effect is the difference between equations (1) and (2), where 
“unconditional” denotes that returns are not conditioned on managers’ issue decision. In the 
general case where the equity offering changes the issuer’s risk, this is  
    1 0 1 0 1 0( ) ( )i i i i iE R X E R X d d X             (3) 
where a negative 1 0d d  corresponds to SEO underperformance. While equation (3) is the 
commonly estimated (pooled) cross-sectional regression, it fails to model the source of abnormal 
performance, 1 0d d .  
 
 3.2. A conditional estimator of SEO returns  
To generate unbiased and consistent estimates of SEO post-issue risk exposure and test the 
underreaction hypothesis, we model managers’ issue decision. Managers issue equity based on 
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their assessment of the offering’s expected benefits, *iD . The equity issue selection equation 
models *iD  as a function of observable and unobservable components, iZ   and diu , 
*
i i diD Z u         (4) 
The component iZ   captures the issue benefits that both managers and investors observe. For 
example, managers and investors can use market and accounting measures to assess the value of 
positive NPV projects available to the firm, the average return on investment expected from 
exercising growth options, and the equity dilution cost to old shareholders of issuing new shares. 
The component diu  captures the issue benefits observed by managers alone, i.e. managers’ private 
information. In line with the underreaction hypothesis, diu  captures the benefit of issuing 
overvalued equity.  
 Firms announce an equity issue, 1iD  , only if the expected issue benefits are positive, 
* 0iD  , where the normalized threshold is zero. Investors observe the issue decision and the 
component iZ  . They do not observe diu  but can infer it from the issue decision. For example, 
they can infer from a firm’s decision to issue that diu  must be high if iZ   is too low to justify the 
offering. Similarly for non-issuers, high anticipated issue benefits, iZ  , are likely to be associated 
with low diu  for the expected issue benefits to remain negative.  
We observe returns in the issue (non-issue) state if the expected benefits are positive 
(negative), *1  0i iD iff D   ( *0   0i iD iff D  ), which implies that SEO post-issue returns are 
conditional on *iD . Accordingly, the conditional expected SEO excess returns are 
   *1 1 1( , 0) 0      i f i i i i di iE R R X D X E u u Z                (5) 
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   *0 0 0( , 0) 0      i f i i i i di iE R R X D X E u u Z
  
   (6)            
for firm i in the acts of issuing and not issuing.7 In simple terms, expected SEO post-issue 
performance depends on risk and a conditional error term. If the underreaction hypothesis holds, 
post-issue abnormal performance is due to prices gradually incorporating managers’ private 
information, diu , i.e.,  1 0 0i di iE u u Z     and  0 0 0i di iE u u Z    .  
  
3.3. Estimating the return effect of managers’ private information 
To estimate equations (5) and (6), we assume bivariate normal distributions for 1iu , diu  and 0iu , 
diu  with covariances 1du u and 0du u , which transforms equations (5) and (6) to 
     
1
1 1
*
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( , 0)
1 ( )
                          
              
          
    
d
d
d
d
d d
d
i u
i f i i i i di i i u u
i u
i u
i u u i u u i
i u
Z
E R R X D X E u u Z X
Z
Z
X X
Z
          (7) 
 
0
0
*
0 0 0 0
0 0
( )( , 0)
1 ( )
                          
         
          
d
d
d
d
i u
i f i i i i di i i u u
i u
i u u i
Z
E R R X D X E u u Z X
Z
X
          (8) 
where (.)  and (.)  are the standard normal pdf and cdf and 1i  and 0i  are inverse Mills ratios. 
Equations (7) and (8) are standard representations of Heckman’s (1979) sample selection 
adjustment, but we show that the inverse Mills ratios also measure the announcement date 
information revealed by managers.  
                                                 
7
 When 1iu  and 0 iu  are correlated with diu , i.e., when investors underreact to managers’ private information revealed 
by the issue and ( , ) 0di icorr u X  , equations (5) and (6) give unbiased and consistent estimators of ' . This follows 
from directly modeling manager’s endogenous decision to issue and including its effect in the regression specification 
based on equations (5) and (6), which corrects for the omitted variables bias. 
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In equations (7) and (8), 
1 1du u i
   and 
0 0du u i
   capture the effect of information revealed by 
the issue announcement and non-announcement on subsequent performance.8 The size of the stock 
price adjustment after the issue depends on the amount of private information diu  (since low iZ   
means high diu to reach the issue threshold, which in turn leads to high 1i ),9 on the strength of the 
correlation between the error terms in the selection equation (4) and outcome equations (1) and (2) 
(
1 11d d iu u u u
   and 
0 00d d iu u u u
    for the issue and non-issue states), and on the variances of 
diu , 1iu , and 0iu . Intuitively, the correlation coefficients 1  and 0  measure the proportion of the 
announcement date information that stock prices impound after the issue. Perfect correlation 
means post-issue returns reflect all the announcement date information and zero correlation means 
stock prices fully impound managerial information at the offering announcement. With high 
variation in the magnitude of private information, 
du
 , a larger diu  is more likely. Larger diu means 
larger benefits of issuing overvalued equity, consistent with greater misvaluation. High return 
volatility, 
1iu
 and 
0 iu
 , is commonly associated with high firm value uncertainty and potentially 
larger stock mispricing.  
Subtracting equation (8) from equation (7) gives the conditional issue effect  
1 0
* *
1 0 1 0 1 0( , 0) ( , 0) d di i i i i i u u i u u i iE R X D E R X D X                      (9) 
where 
1 01 0d du u i u u i
     is the post-event stock price adjustment in the issue vs. non-issue states as 
the market impounds the information diu , and  1 0iX     is the differential risk exposure. Unlike 
                                                 
8
 Scaling iZ 
 
by the cross-sectional standard deviation of manager’s private information, 
du
 , ensures comparability 
of diu  across firms and normalizes its variance to one. 
9
 For a given iZ  , if a firm issues, investors can infer that diu  is larger than in the non-issue state to reach the threshold 
0diiZ u   . As iZ   falls, diu  needs to be higher to reach the threshold, leading to a larger 1i . 
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equation (3), equation (9) distinguishes the behavioral explanation for low SEO returns (investor 
underreaction) from the rational (risk-based) explanation, allowing a test of the underreaction 
hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts a negative relation between post-issue returns and the surprise 
component of the issue announcement, 1i , reflecting managers’ information about stock 
mispricing. If the underreaction hypothesis is true, 
1du u
  should be negative for equity issuers. 
Intuitively, a highly unexpected issue conveys more information and post-issue abnormal 
performance should be lower. Equation (9) also provides an unbiased and consistent test of the 
discount rate effect. If issuing lowers risk, a discount rate effect corresponds to  1 0 0iX     . 
To control for SEO returns in the non-issue state, following Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1995) and other studies, we use size–B/M matched control firms.10 As benchmark stocks do not 
announce a non-issue decision and issue decisions are largely unexpected, we predict an 
insignificant relation between 
0du u
 and benchmark stock returns.  
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that it takes up to 
five years for the initial underreaction to SEO announcements to disappear. This is at odds with 
empirical evidence that suggests irrational investor behavior is more short-lived. For example, 
Michaely et al. (1995) find that stocks announcing dividend initiations or omissions exhibit 
abnormal stock performance over the following twelve months. Womack (1996) finds that the 
initial underreaction to unfavorable changes in analyst recommendations corrects within six 
months. Bernard and Thomas (1989) report that the initial underreaction to earnings 
announcements corrects within three quarters. A more likely scenario for SEOs, therefore, is that 
stock prices fully impound managers’ private information well within five years and a discount 
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 Baker and Wurgler (2000) argue that managers can time not only individual stock mispricing, but also market-wide 
mispricing. Size–B/M matching over the post-issue period also controls for market-wide mispricing. 
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rate effect dominates over the remaining holding period. To estimate how rapidly prices impound 
the issue signal, we vary the return holding period. Once stock prices fully impound the signal, we 
should find no relation between lambda and issuer returns. 
While the underreaction hypothesis predicts that investors underreact to private 
information about stock mispricing revealed by the issue, investors could also underreact to public 
information on firm mispricing. For example, investors may only partially discount the 
information contained in abnormal stock return performance before the announcement. Including 
this information in the regression controls for any delayed reaction to public information.     
 
3.4. Empirical specification issues 
The empirical validity of model (9) hinges on accurately identifying the systematic component of 
the equity issue decision in equation (4),
 
iZ  . If the equity issue decision model excludes publicly 
available information, it becomes part of the error term and lambda. To check whether lambda 
captures public information omitted from iZ  , we conduct two tests. First, we test whether lambda 
predicts the returns of size–B/M benchmark stocks. Second, we relate lambda to returns of random 
samples of non-issuing stocks. An insignificant relation between lambda and benchmark or non-
issuer stock returns suggests that there is no significant public information component in lambda 
and no misspecification of the empirical model in equation (4).      
 
4. Data and sample selection criteria 
Our sample of seasoned equity offerings is from the SDC New Issues database. The sample period 
is January 1970 to December 2007. To allow for a three-year holding period, the last offering is in 
December 2004. The sample includes all CRSP US domiciled companies listed on 
14 
 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq at the time of the SEO that issue pure primary shares or combinations of 
primary and equity sales by a major shareholder (combinations) in the US market. We include 
industrial, financial, and utility firms but exclude unit offerings and SEOs that simultaneously offer 
debt, preferred stock, or warrants. We exclude private placements, exchange offers of stock, 144A 
offers, cancelled offers, and spin-off related issues. We also exclude SEOs within three years of 
an IPO to prevent IPO underperformance influencing the results. These criteria lead to an initial 
sample of 8,223 issues. Excluding equity offerings by the same company that occur within the 
three-year holding period of the first equity offering, reduces the sample to 5,121. Retaining 
offerings of common stock only (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) with stock return data available for 
at least a month after the issue leaves 4,931 issues.11 Obtaining a conditional estimator of abnormal 
returns requires non-missing CRSP/Compustat annual data for two fiscal years before the issue. 
We use accounting data for the fiscal year ending at least six months before the issue date, leaving 
3,047 SEOs.12 Following Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), we 
use only issuers and benchmark stocks with positive equity book values in the matching process, 
which reduces the sample to 2,879 SEOs for which we find control stocks. NYSE/AMEX and 
Nasdaq listed stocks on CRSP that have not issued new equity for the past three years provide a 
pool of potential matching stocks.    
Table 2 reports the distribution of the SEOs across NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq exchanges, 
broad industry groups (financial, industry, and utility), nine Fama and French size and B/M 
portfolios, and issue period. Of the 2,879 SEOs, 46.58% list on NYSE/AMEX and 53.42% on 
Nasdaq. Industrial issuers are the largest group, with 2,498 SEOs. Splitting issuers into three 
                                                 
11
 Using CRSP share codes 10 and 11 excludes closed-end funds and REITs. 
12
 To match an SEO with a non-issuing control firm, we use book value of equity for the fiscal year two years before 
the issue if the offering is in the first six months of the year and book value for the previous fiscal year for offers in 
the second six months of the year.  
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portfolios, small (S), medium (Me), and big (B) by market value of common equity using NYSE 
breakpoints, 1,489 are small capitalization firms. A corresponding split on B/M into high (H), 
medium (M), and low (L) gives 1,148 low B/M stocks, of which 534 are small. Previous studies 
document that small, low B/M stocks, which are subject to larger valuation errors and more 
susceptible to misvaluation, dominate equity issuers (e.g., Brav et al., 2000, Table 2). The number 
of issuers increases over time, with 169 SEOs occurring in the 1970s and 1,084 between 2000 and 
2004.13  
 
5. The long-run performance of SEOs: unconditional estimates of the issue effect 
Barber and Lyon (1997) show that tests using buy-and-hold abnormal returns and size–B/M 
matches are well specified, and studies of SEO underperformance largely follow this design.14 We 
replicate matching based on the closest neighbor approach. Of non-issuing firms within a 30% 
range of the issuer’s market value at the year-end before the offering, we select a matching firm 
with the closest B/M to the issuer’s. Non-issuers are companies that are not listed as equity issuers 
on the SDC New Issues database for the past three years. The definition of B/M follows Fama and 
French (1992). Each control stock pairs with one SEO over the three-year holding period. If a 
control stock delists or issues equity, we choose a new match from the original list of eligible 
controls. If an issuing firm delists, we truncate the SEO and its match return on that date. 
Sample firm i's it -month buy-and-hold return (BHR) is  1 1 1iti iBHR R    , starting 
at the beginning of the first calendar month after the issue and finishing at the earlier of the three-
year anniversary or the delisting date. The average holding period return across N sample stocks 
                                                 
13
 The lower number of SEOs in the early sample period is partly due to Nasdaq data being unavailable on CRSP 
before December 1972 and less complete Compustat coverage in the 1970s.  
14
 Calendar time regressions using Fama and French’s (1993) model also record SEO underperformance (Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995, 2000, Lyandres et al., 2008, Eckbo et al., 2000).  
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is 
1
N
i ii
BHR x BHR  where ix  denotes equally weighted (EW) or value-weighted (VW). Value 
weights are market capitalizations scaled by the S&P 500 stock market index one month before 
the offer to ensure that early and late sample observations have consistent weights.    
Table 3 reports average BHRs for issuers and their matches over a three-year holding 
period. Column Diff, denoting the difference between these two figures, gives issuers’ buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR). Panel A shows EW and VW results. The average BHAR using EW 
is −25.87% and −22.6% using VW. Underperformance is significant in all specifications at 1% 
based on skewness-adjusted t-statistics recommended by Lyon et al. (1999).    
We previously argued that abnormal performance following equity issues should be 
relatively short-lived, as investors correct their valuations and stock prices impound the 
announcement date signal. We test this prediction in Table 3, Panel B where we increase the return 
holding period one month at a time. BHARs are −11.33% for a one-year holding period, −21.34% 
for a two-year holding period, and −25.87% for a three-year holding period. The geometric average 
abnormal monthly return over the first sixteen months following the issue is −1.054%, while it is 
−0.834% over the next ten months, and −0.459 over the last ten months of the three-year holding 
period.15 This suggests SEO underperformance concentrates shortly after the offering.16 
The unconditional estimator of abnormal returns in equation (3) highlights the differential 
risk exposure of SEOs and benchmark stocks as a potential explanation of issuer 
underperformance. Previous studies suggest that post-offering SEO performance relates to a 
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 Loughran and Ritter (1995) document strong SEO underperformance relative to size-matched control firms over 
months 7–18 after the issue. They report less negative issuer abnormal performance over months 19–60. 
16
 Ritter (2003, Table 1) finds that a sample of 6,638 SEOs over 1970–2000 have average buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns of 2% compared to size–B/M control firms in the six months after the issue. Relative to Ritter’s sample, we 
exclude SEOs within 36 months of an IPO, multiple issues, and SEOs without necessary Compustat data. Over 1970–
1990, these additional data requirements increase average SEO market capitalization by 19.62% and lower issuer 
performance to an (insignificant) −2.38%. Lifting the restrictions gives an insignificant six-month BHAR of 1.98%.  
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number of risk factors and market characteristics. These include the issuer’s equity market value 
and B/M ratio, leverage (Eckbo et al., 2000), stock liquidity (Eckbo and Norli, 2005), and 
investment rates (Lyandres et al., 2008). In addition to these characteristics, we control for firm 
profitability measured by return on assets. Chen et al. (2010), building on the q-theory of 
investment (Tobin, 1969; Cochrane, 1991), link discount rates to firm investment and profitability. 
This is because, given a firm’s profitability, a low discount rate means high net present values of 
new projects, which stimulates new investment. They propose a three factor model in which 
market, investment, and profitability factors explain a wide cross-section of stock returns and 
several anomalies that the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models fail to capture. 
Finally, the timing hypothesis predicts equity issues follow abnormal stock price performance. We 
use the market-adjusted stock return over the six pre-issue months to proxy for a firm’s pre-issue 
misvaluation.17       
Table 4, Panel A verifies the above predictions by reporting results of a regression with 
three-year BHRs of SEOs or their matches as the dependent variable. The independent variables 
include, in log form, book-to-market ratio (B/M), equity market value (MV), leverage (LEV), and 
illiquidity level (LM12).18 LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. LM12 is Liu’s (2006) 
trading discontinuity measure of liquidity, which builds on the intuition that a large number of no 
trading days indicates trading discontinuity and the potential difficulty in executing an order, and 
the turnover adjustment captures the ability to trade large quantities of stock.19  Liu (2010) shows 
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 Descriptive statistics for these variables and the variables related to the equity issue decision are in Table 5.  
18
 Market values in all regressions are deflated by the S&P 500 market index to give comparability over time.  
19
 Liu (2006, p.635) defines LM12 as the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero-trading volume days over the 
prior 12 months,       number of zero volume days in prior 12 months 1 12 21 12TR Deflator NoTD    , 
where TR12 is the sum of daily turnover (in percentage) over the prior 12 months, Deflator = 20,000 to ensure that 
1 12 1TR Deflator  , and NoTD is the number of trading days over the prior 12 months;  21 12 NoTD standardizes 
the number of trading days in a month to 21. Sorting stocks on LM12 is equivalent to a first sort on the number of zero 
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that LM12 captures multiple liquidity dimensions and that it generates a more robust liquidity 
premium than the bid-ask spread, Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs, 
Lesmond et al.’s (1999) number of zero daily returns, stock turnover, and Amihud’s (2002) return-
to-volume measure. The independent variables also include the investment-to-assets ratio (INV/A), 
return on assets (ROA), and pre-issue abnormal performance (pAB). INV/A is the change in 
property plant and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by lagged asset value. 
ROA is income before extraordinary items over lagged asset value. pAB is the difference between 
the firm’s and the CRSP VW NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index buy-and-hold returns over the six 
months before the issue. B/M, LEV, ROA and INV/A are measured in December at least six months 
before the issue. MV and LM12 are measured one month before the issue. Accounting variables 
and LM12 are winsorized based on the CRSP population at 1%.  
The results show no relation between SEO long-run performance and pre-issue stock 
liquidity.20  Larger issuers and issuers with higher B/M ratios earn higher post-issue returns. The 
positive coefficient on leverage confirms results in Eckbo et al. (2000) that increased leverage and 
a resultant higher exposure to default risk leads to higher realized rates of return for equity holders. 
The coefficient on INV/A is negative, consistent with Lyandres et al. (2008). As in Chen et al. 
(2010), higher profitability increases stock returns. A significant relation between SEO long-run 
returns and pAB suggests that stock prices do not fully impound publicly available information 
about firm misvaluation at the announcement date. Matching stocks’ BHRs vary significantly with 
pre-issue B/M, LM12, LEV, INV/A, and ROA.  
                                                 
daily trading volumes with a turnover sort resolving any ties, where the latter applies primarily to frequently traded 
stocks with zero non-trading days.  
20
 Results in Table 4 use year- and industry-clustered standard errors and all variables are expressed as decimals rather 
than percentages in this and subsequent regressions. 
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Table 4, Panel B examines the role of the discount rate effect,  1 0iX   , in explaining 
long-run SEO underperformance. We mimic the unobservable expected return on sample firm i in 
the non-issuing state by the return on a benchmark j,    0 00, 0,i i i j j jE R D X E R D X   . This 
leads to the discount rate effect being a function of differences in characteristics, 0 0i jX X , and 
risk exposures, 1 0  . Column Beta diff reports coefficient differences for the two regressions 
in Panel A. SEOs have significantly lower B/M and ROA coefficients and a higher MV coefficient 
than matching stocks. However, 1 0d d  remains significant at −18.2%.21 This shows that 
controlling for differences in risk, SEOs underperform their control stocks. The last four columns 
of Panel B report mean firm characteristics for SEOs (X SEO), matches (X matches), and their 
differences (X diff) over the 3-year post-issue period.22 SEOs are on average larger and more liquid 
than benchmark firms in the post-issue period with higher investment rates and book-to-market 
ratios, and lower gearing and profitability. With the exception of differences in post-issue B/M 
ratios, this suggests lower SEO expected returns than for control stocks. The difference in log B/M 
is small (0.024) and more than offset by a lower SEO B/M coefficient (0.092) compared to control 
firms (0.189).  
Based on the results in Table 4, new equity issuers have lower post-issue risk than matching 
stocks, consistent with the discount rate hypothesis. However, controlling for risk, SEOs continue 
to underperform benchmark stocks, which suggests that a discount rate effect alone does not 
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 The −18.2% estimate of SEO abnormal performance in Table 4, Panel B, is not comparable with the −25.87% 
abnormal performance in Table 3, Panel A, as the former figure is the abnormal performance when the values of the 
risk characteristics, Xi, are set to zero. 
22
 In calculating mean three-year post-issue characteristics we use all annual non-missing characteristics available for 
SEOs and control stocks. The table omits pAB, which relates to the pre-issue period. Table 5 below reports mean pAB 
for SEOs, matching stocks, and their difference before the issue.  
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explain low issuer returns. Next, we turn to the conditional estimator of SEO abnormal returns to 
test the underreaction explanation for SEO post-offering performance.  
 
6. Predicting the issue decision and conditional estimates of the issue effect  
To obtain the conditional estimator of SEO abnormal returns in equation (9), we need 1i and 0i  
from the equity issue selection equation (4). We use Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to 
estimate the equity issue decision and decompose SEO expected returns in the issue and non-issue 
states. The procedure uses a probit model to estimate the anticipated component of the issue 
decision, iZ  . To ensure the probit model uses the latest information available before the issue 
with no hindsight bias, we measure market-based explanatory variables one month before the 
event. The accounting variables are for December at least six months before the issue. Accounting 
variables and LM12 are winsorized based on the CRSP population at 1%. We group explanatory 
variables into five categories according to issue motives.  
Firm overvaluation 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that stock mispricing encourages firms to issue overvalued 
equity. We use five variables to capture variation in firm mispricing. To measure pre-offering 
abnormal return performance we use pAB. A dummy variable, Hot, which equals 1 if the number 
of sample SEOs in the month before issue is above the median monthly number of sample SEOs 
over the previous 36 months and zero otherwise, captures waves of new equity issues as firms 
cluster offerings to exploit periodic stock mispricing (Loughran and Ritter, 2000). The variable 
Hot also captures Schultz’s (2003) pseudo market timing hypothesis, which argues that equity 
issue waves coincide with peaks in stock market performance. Year dummies (Year dummies) and 
twelve industry dummies (Industry dummies) based on Kenneth French’s industry definitions 
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capture time and industry variation in mispricing. An indicator variable (Nasdaq) distinguishes 
Nasdaq from NYSE/AMEX listed firms.  
Growth options 
Carlson et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2009) argue that firms make SEOs to pursue profitable growth 
opportunities. We use B/M and INV/A to measure growth options. Harjat and Garen (2003) report 
that 42% of IPOs make SEOs within four years of their IPOs. Younger and smaller firms require 
more investment capital at the start of their life cycle. We measure firm age (ln Age) as the 
difference between a firm’s first CRSP listing date and the issue date, in log form. We use ln MV 
to measure firm size.  
Leverage and financial constraints 
The pecking order theory predicts that firms with insufficient internal funds to finance new 
investment resort to external financing. We use earnings growth (EG), ROA, and the inverse of the 
ratio of capital expenditures to the change in retained earnings plus depreciation and amortization 
(IFC) to measure a firm’s ability to generate internal funds. Myers (1977), Jensen (1986), and 
Stulz (1990) point out that high leverage limits a firm’s ability to exploit new investment 
opportunities. We use LEV to control for the higher propensity of high leverage firms to issue 
equity rather than debt to finance new projects.  
Stock liquidity 
Eckbo et al. (2000) point out that an equity issue may improve a stock’s liquidity and reduce the 
firm’s expected returns. Butler et al. (2005) report that investment banks charge lower fees to firms 
with more liquid stock before the offering. Higher pre-SEO liquidity can ensure a higher uptake 
of new shares, lowering issue costs. To capture the effect of stock liquidity on the equity issue 
decision, we use LM12.  
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Information releases 
Korajczyk et al. (1991, 1992) predict that firms time equity issues to follow credible and significant 
information releases, which temporarily reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. We create dummy variables (Issue month dummies) corresponding to calendar months.23 
Given the prevalence of December fiscal year-ends in the US, we expect issues to cluster around 
the earnings announcement months of March to June. 
 
To estimate the probit model we require a sample of non-issuing firms. To select this 
sample, we use a procedure similar to Guo and Mech (2000). We randomly choose 60,000 security 
month–years (based on a random number generator and selection without replacement) from the 
monthly CRSP/Compustat merged files over 1970–2004. Excluding firms with insufficient 
CRSP/Compustat data leaves a sample of 21,101 non-issuing firm–year observations. Adding to 
these observations our size–B/M benchmark stocks gives a sample of 23,980 pseudo non-issuing 
events. Size–B/M matched stocks share pseudo non-event dates with the sample of SEOs. 
The conditional returns of SEOs and matches, equation (7) and (8), are estimated jointly 
with the equity issue selection model, equation (4). This requires exclusion restrictions to ensure 
identification of the return equations, as missing or low quality instruments may result in 
collinearity between lambda and the discount rate effect (Li and Prabhala, 2008). The conditional 
returns equations include variables that previous studies find control for SEO risk and publicly 
available information predicting equity mispricing. Nasdaq, industry, year, hot and issue month 
dummies, firm age, the inverse of the firm’s ability to generate internal funds, and earnings growth 
from the equity issue choice model (equation 4) form the instrument set. Previous studies provide 
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 To avoid multicollinearity, the model excludes one year, one industry and one issue month dummy. 
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no evidence that any of the dummy variables predict stock returns, which justifies excluding them 
from the return regression.24 A firm’s ability to generate internal funds and earnings growth 
determine a firm’s cash holding and its ability to finance new projects from internal as opposed to 
external sources.     
 Table 5, Panel A reports means, medians, and standard deviations of the variables that 
relate to the equity issue decision or control for risk for SEOs, matches, and the remaining CRSP 
stocks. The final four columns test for differences in characteristics between SEOs and their 
matches and between SEOs and CRSP stocks. SEOs exhibit higher six-month pre-issue price run-
up than matching firms (39.63% vs. 15.26%) and the remaining CRSP stocks (6.66%). They are 
also more likely to list on Nasdaq than are matches and the remaining CRSP stocks. Size–B/M 
matching before the issue is successful, but compared to their matches and the remaining CRSP 
stocks, SEOs have significantly higher investment rates, leverage, financial constraints and 
liquidity, and lower profitability.25  SEOs are younger than their matches and the remaining CRSP 
stocks, consistent with a higher reliance of younger firms on external capital. They also have 
significantly higher earnings growth compared to their matches and the remaining CRSP stocks 
and issues are more likely to cluster in periods of heavy issuing activity (Hot = 0.803 vs. 0.527). 
Table 5, Panel B reports Pearson correlations between the variables. The magnitudes of the 
correlations are low, being 0.068 on average.  
 Table 6 reports the results of modeling the issue decision using a probit model applied to 
26,859 firm–year observations and shows positive and significant coefficients on pAB, Nasdaq  
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 As we exclude IPO firms from our sample, age should play no role in predicting stock returns. Ex post, the internet 
bubble makes the 2001 year dummy a predictor of low returns in 2002. At the firm-level, however, the 2001 dummy 
is likely to be a much weaker predictor of returns and including (weakly) endogenous variables as instruments can 
improve estimation efficiency (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
25
 SEOs improve stock liquidity after the issue, which explains the lower LM12 value after the offering in Table 3. 
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and a number of year, issue, and industry dummies (not reported). Periods of heavy (prior) issuing 
activity increase the likelihood of an equity offering and in our sample, larger companies are more 
likely to issue equity. High growth options, investment rates, and being early in the corporate life 
cycle, increase the propensity to issue. There is partial support for the financial constraints 
prediction, with a negative coefficient on ROA but insignificant coefficients on IFC and EG. High 
firm leverage and liquidity increase the probability of an equity issue.26   
 The marginal effects (ME) indicate the importance of each variable in the issue decision. 
INV/A is the principal positive contributor to the issue decision (7.27%), indicating that firms issue 
equity to pursue new investment. This is consistent with DeAngelo et al. (2010), Loughran and 
Ritter (1997), and Lyandres et al. (2008), who report high SEO investment rates before and after 
the offering. As in Huang and Ritter (2009) and DeAngelo et al. (2010), we find less profitable 
firms with insufficient internal funds are more likely to issue, with a unit decrease in ROA 
contributing 6.25% to the probability of issue. These results are consistent with Myers and Majluf’s 
(1984) rational equity issue model. Pre-issue abnormal performance, pAB, has a strong positive 
impact on the issue decision, which suggests managers are more likely to issue following recent 
price appreciation. Loughran and Ritter (2000, 362–363) argue that “[i]f there are time-varying 
misvaluations that firms capitalize on by taking some action (a supply response), there will be 
more events involving larger misvaluations in some periods than in others”. Hot has a positive 
influence on the issue probability, consistent with Loughran and Ritter’s prediction.  
     Table 6, Panel B reports the predicted probability of an equity issue based on the estimates 
in Panel A for the sample of SEOs, matches, and the remaining CRSP stocks. A random non-
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 Unreported results show a significantly lower likelihood of equity issues in January and February. Straddling the 
(sample median) December fiscal year-end and the earnings announcement season (March), these months are likely 
to have higher levels of information asymmetry. Firms are also less likely to issue between July and October. 
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issuing CRSP stock has an 8.92% probability of issuing equity in a given year. Matching firms 
have a higher issue probability (13.91%), while SEOs have the highest predicted issue probability 
(20.14%). Despite investors partly anticipating new equity issues, the results suggest that SEOs 
surprise the market. Intuitively, even though investors rate certain stocks as being on average twice 
as likely to issue equity than an average (non-issuing) stock, not issuing is four times as likely even 
for these stocks. If investors are rational, stock prices should, on average, impound a fifth of the 
total issue effect before the offering with the issue announcement revealing the remaining 80% 
arising from managerial private information. Investors should discount this surprise component 
immediately and fully (see Figure 1a). If SEO stock prices do not react fully to managerial private 
information, there will be a negative relation between managerial information revealed at the 
announcement and post-issue stock returns.  
Results in Table 6 underscore the importance of the unobservable private information in 
driving the issue decision. If investors behave less-than-rationally, our private information 
measure, lambda, will be a strong determinant of post-issue return. This suggests that tests of the 
underreaction hypothesis that relate publicly available information before the issue, e.g. abnormal 
price performance, rather than lambda to post-issue SEO returns have low power.  
 
6.1. The long-run performance of SEOs—conditional estimates  
The probit model results confirm that equity offerings are unexpected events and issue 
announcements convey significant information about managers’ private information, diu , that is 
unobservable before the announcement. If the market rationally impounds this information, there 
should be a complete and unbiased price reaction at the issue announcement and post-offering 
stock returns should compensate for risk. If the market initially underreacts to the information and 
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gradually corrects the overvaluation after the event, we should observe post-offering 
underperformance and post-issue correction should be larger for less anticipated SEOs.  
Table 7, Panel A reports results for the conditional estimator of abnormal returns for SEOs 
and their control stocks, where the inverse Mills ratios ( 0 1,    ) proxy for unobservable private 
information.27 As predicted, the coefficient on 1  is significantly negative (−0.165, p = 0.028), 
indicating that greater private information leads to lower post-event performance.28 A one-standard 
deviation increase in lambda (0.384) leads to a 6.33% lower SEO buy-and-hold return over the 
three years after the issue. SEO performance varies positively with pre-issue B/M, MV (at 10%), 
LEV, and ROA, and negatively with INV/A and pAB. There is no relation between private 
information and average returns for matching stocks, consistent with the random assignment of 
pseudo-event dates and lambda measuring only information revealed by managers at equity issue 
announcements.29 Similar to SEOs, long-run BHRs of matching stocks are positively related to 
pre-issue B/M, LEV, and ROA, and negatively related to INV/A and stock illiquidity (at 10%). 
Table 7, Panel B reports mean 1  and 0 , and Pearson correlations between lambdas and 
the explanatory variables for SEOs and matching stocks. Mean lambda for SEOs is significantly 
higher than for matching stocks (1.485 vs. −0.252), which confirms the amount of private 
information revealed by managers at the SEO announcement.30 All correlations are significant, 
with the average absolute correlation between lambda and the explanatory variables being 0.229 
(0.243) for SEOs (matches).  
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 Including intercept terms captures any misspecification of the empirical model due to a failure to control for a 
delayed market reaction when comparing SEO and benchmark stock performance.  
28
 Asymptotically consistent standard errors adjust for inclusion of first-stage predictors in the model. 
29
 Table 9 reports further tests of lambda’s validity in capturing only the SEO announcement effect, using the random 
non-issuer sample from the equity issue choice model in Table 5. 
30
 The lambda coefficients in Table 7, Panel A adjust for higher SEO than control firm mean lambda (1.485 vs. 
−0.252), which explains higher point estimate magnitudes for 0 i  (−0.231) than 1i (−0.165). 
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Table 7, Panel C reports coefficient differences between the two Panel A regressions and 
tests their significance. Including lambda in the conditional return regressions, we find no 
indications of SEO underperformance, with the intercept difference being indistinguishable from 
zero. Coefficient differences between regressions of SEOs and matches show similar significance 
levels to Table 4, Panel C, except for ROA, which is indistinguishable from zero. This suggests 
unconditional estimates in Table 4 understate lower SEO post-issue risk exposure compared to 
benchmark stocks due to omitting lambda, i.e.    1 0 1 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi iX X        .  
From Table 7, we can obtain an unbiased and consistent estimate of issuer 
underperformance due to investor underreaction. From equation (9), we estimate SEO 
underperformance as the difference between the products of the covariance and lambda estimates 
for SEOs and matching stocks, 
1 01 0
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
d du u i u u i
    ,  plus the difference between SEO and matching 
stock intercepts.31 This gives an SEO underperformance estimate due to investor underreaction 
over the three years after the issue of −15.43%, which accounts for 59% of the −25.87% abnormal 
performance in Table 3. Lower SEO risk exposure after the issue leads to abnormal performance 
of −10.44% relative to size–B/M control stocks, which confirms that investor delay in impounding 
the information surprise at the issue announcement is the main generator of SEO abnormal 
performance.32  
Overall, the results in Table 7 confirm the hypothesis that a delayed reaction to managers’ 
private information revealed by the equity issue leads to negative post-issue abnormal 
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 The intercepts capture potential misspecification of the empirical model in Table 6 and their difference has zero 
expectation. 
32
 A sensitivity analysis shows that a 10% higher lambda coefficient increases the share of SEO underperformance 
attributable to investor underreaction from the current level of 59% to 69%. A lambda coefficient of −0.235 means 
investor irrationality accounts for nearly 100% of total SEO underperformance and is the upper bound for a 
“reasonable” lambda estimate. 
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performance. After the offering, there is a negative relation between SEO stock returns and 
managers’ private information but there is no relation between private information and average 
returns for matching stocks. 
 
6.2. Sensitivity analysis 
Table 7 shows a significant negative relation between SEO long-run returns and managers’ private 
information revealed by the announcement, proxied by 1 . This suggests that investors only 
partially discount the information surprise at the issue announcement and this underreaction 
corrects over a post-offering period. Next, we examine the sensitivity of the results to pre-issue 
abnormal return performance, SEO attrition before the end of the holding period, delisting returns, 
and periods of high equity issue volume.  
If higher investor optimism about firm prospects leads to greater stock overvaluation, we 
should find greater underperformance for SEOs preceded by higher stock price performance. Table 
8, Panel A tests this prediction, where we report regression results for SEOs with high and low 
pre-issue abnormal performance.33 While 1  is insignificant for low pAB SEOs, high pAB SEOs 
have a significant 1  coefficient of −0.194; a one-standard deviation increase in lambda (0.47) for 
high pAB SEOs leads to a 9.13% lower buy-and-hold return over the three years after the issue. 
These results support the prediction that investors underreact more to SEO announcements 
preceded by a strong price run-up.  
Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) address the impact of omitting 
delisting returns on stock return calculations. Both studies find that including delisting returns can 
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 We estimate subsample cross-sectional regressions jointly with the equity issue model (equation 4) to ensure 
consistent standard error estimates. The results are indistinguishable from regression estimates that use the original 
lambda estimates from Table 6. For example, the percentage difference in SEO lambda coefficients for the two 
approaches is 3.87% for high pAB in Table 8, Panel A.  
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significantly alter inferences on many anomalies. For example, Shumway and Warther (1999) find 
that correcting for delisting bias eliminates the size effect for Nasdaq stocks. Beaver et al. (2007) 
confirm that including delisting returns increases the average return difference between extreme 
decile portfolios partitioned on earnings, cash flows, and B/M ratio. To ensure omitting delisting 
returns does not affect our results, we repeat our analysis using CRSP delisting returns. Where a 
delisting return is missing, we assume a return of −1 for delisting due to liquidation (CRSP codes 
400–490), −0.33 for performance related delisting (500 and 520–584), and zero otherwise. Using 
delisting returns has virtually no effect on coefficient estimates indicating that our findings are 
robust to delisting bias (results not tabulated). This is consistent with Shumway (1997) who finds 
a less than 1% per year difference in three-year underperformance estimates for NYSE/AMEX 
listed IPOs after adjusting for delisting bias.  
SEO attrition before the end of the three-year holding period may affect our results. For 
example, low buy-and-hold returns over the 36–month post-issue period can result from delayed 
market reaction or from firm attrition due to bankruptcy or acquisition. If the delisting probability 
depends on 1 , low estimated returns may be due to intervening events rather than to a delayed 
market reaction to an SEO announcement. There are 2,419 SEOs with 36 months of returns. For 
455 SEOs the CRSP files identify the reason for delisting before the end of the three-year holding 
period: 285 delist due to mergers/acquisitions, 157 are delisted by their exchange 
(NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq), and 13 delist due to an exchange of shares for another type of asset. 
While it involves a hindsight bias, we repeat our analysis using only SEOs that survive to the end 
of the three-year holding period (results not tabulated). The results are qualitatively similar to those 
in Table 7, Panel A. Coefficient signs and significance are similar for the sample without return 
attrition. 
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Loughran and Ritter (2000) report greater underperformance following periods of heavy 
issuing activity. If time-varying investor optimism (sentiment) about firm prospects leads to 
mispricing of a group of stocks and consequent equity issue waves, greater underreaction to 
managerial private information can lead to greater underperformance following periods of high 
issue volume. Table 8, Panel B reports conditional estimates of the issue effect in hot and cold 
issuing periods.34  There are 2,311 equity offerings in hot and 568 in cold issue periods. SEOs in 
hot periods have a 1  coefficient of −0.403, while 1  is indistinguishable from zero in cold periods. 
The downward trend in 1  in moving from low to high issue volume months and relative to the 
pooled sample in Table 7, Panel A is consistent with investors underreacting more to SEO 
announcements made during hot issue periods. 
 
6.3. Empirical model specification 
Using lambda to proxy for managers’ private information inevitably leads to the joint hypothesis 
of underreaction and the validity of the model used to estimate lambda. Misspecification of 
equation (4) may result in lambda picking up publicly available information affecting a wide cross-
section of returns, in addition to SEO-specific managerial private information. We test the 
specification of lambda by relating it to three-year buy-and-hold returns of random non-issuer 
samples from the equity issue choice model in Table 6 (excluding size–B/M benchmark stocks). 
Table 9 shows results for 20,783 non-issuing stocks with non-missing returns after the pseudo 
event date and three random subsamples of 5,000 stocks each. There is no association between 
lambda and non-issuer stock returns. This suggests proper specification of the empirical model in 
equation (4) and supports our main conclusions.  
                                                 
34
 In calculating hot issue periods for 1970–1972, we append our initial SEO sample with annual data from Eckbo et 
al. (2000). We convert the annual to monthly estimates assuming equal monthly issue frequencies.  
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Results for non-issuing stocks in Table 7, Panel A and Table 9 allow us to address the 
classic problem of the SEO and IPO underperformance literature that a factor explaining SEO 
underperformance can proxy for stock misvaluation or risk (Brav and Heaton, 2002). For example, 
Lyandres et al. (2008, p. 2830) acknowledge that sentiment can also explain the relation between 
their investment factor and issuer returns: “Following Fama and French (1993, 1996), we interpret 
the investment factor as a common factor of stock returns. … We do not take a stance on the risk 
interpretation of the investment factor. … General equilibrium models with behavioral biases (e.g., 
Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001), however, also can motivate the investment factor. Moreover, 
investor sentiment can presumably affect investment policy through shareholders’ discount rates 
(e.g., Polk and Sapienza, 2009).”  Our results support only the behavioral explanation for the 
relation between lambda and post-issue SEO returns.  
 
7. How long is the delayed market reaction? 
The previous analysis uses three-year buy-and-hold returns as the dependent variable. To estimate 
the length of the (delayed) reaction to SEO announcements, we re-run the regressions varying the 
buy-and-hold return period and measuring the relation with lambda.   
  To gauge how quickly the market discounts the announcement date information, Table 10 
reports lambda coefficients from regressions where we increase the start date for measuring post-
issue buy-and-hold returns by one month but fix the end of the holding period at month 36 after 
the offering. If stock price fully impounds diu  by month   after the issue, we should find no 
relation between lambda and buy-and-hold returns over months   to 36.35  The results suggest that 
investors impound the negative announcement date information into stock price over a shorter 
                                                 
35
 To ensure consistent standard errors, we estimate the probit and the cross-sectional regressions each event month. 
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period after the offering than the five-year period that Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest. There 
is a significant negative relation between lambda and post-offering long-run returns for SEOs over 
the course of 16 months after the issue (at 5.8% significance). This is consistent with the period of 
negative SEO returns in Table 3, Panel B. Following the 16-month period after the issue, low risk 
explains low SEO returns.36 A sixteen month period to discount managerial information is 
consistent with the length of irrational investor behavior around other corporate events.  
     
8. Conclusions 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) argue that managers act on their 
private information about stock overvaluation in making SEOs, but investors underreact to the 
issue announcement and stock mispricing persists at the issue date. The market revalues the stock 
over an extended period following the offering, leading to negative post-offering abnormal returns. 
We use the inverse Mills ratio (lambda) from a probit model of the issue decision based on publicly 
available information, to proxy for managers’ private information revealed by the issue 
announcement. Less anticipated SEO announcements have higher surprise components, implying 
greater stock overvaluation and giving higher lambdas. To test the underreaction hypothesis, we 
relate lambda to long-run post-issue returns. 
This study documents average SEO abnormal returns of −25.87% relative to size–B/M 
non-issuing stocks over the three years after the issue for a sample of 2,879 equity issues in the US 
over 1970–2004. SEO underperformance decomposes into a −15.43% abnormal performance due 
to investor underreaction to managers’ private information revealed by the issue announcement 
                                                 
36
 The evidence in Ang and Zhang (2004) that the power of calendar time Fama–French factor regressions decreases 
sharply with the event horizon coupled with our evidence that SEO underperformance corrects within 16 months after 
the issue underlines doubts about the power of tests that use calendar time factor regressions with a five-year holding 
period to detect SEO abnormal performance. 
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and a −10.44% return performance due to lower SEO risk exposure after the issue. After the equity 
offering, issuers are larger, more liquid, with higher investment rates and book-to-market ratios, 
and lower gearing and profitability than their size and B/M peers. Investor underreaction to the 
announcement corrects within the first 16 months after the offering. Lower risk explains SEO 
performance after that point.  
Our evidence confirms that a delayed reaction to information in the issue announcement is 
the main generator of SEO abnormal performance. The result is robust to controlling for the effects 
of pre-issue abnormal performance, SEO return attrition before the end of the holding period, 
delisting returns, periods of high equity issue volume, and tests for model misspecification. 
  The study’s research framework is applicable to any corporate event where the endogenous 
decision to participate depends on managers’ private information and investors do not fully react 
to the announcement date signal. Event studies that examine long horizon effects of stock 
repurchases and stock financed acquisitions are two examples where the framework can lead to 
insights. We encourage more European evidence on the length and magnitude of issuer 
underperformance due to less-than-rational investor behavior. Institutional and regulatory 
differences make Europe-centered research an ideal setting for out-of-sample tests.  
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Fig. 1a. The relation between managers’ private information revealed at the issue announcement and SEO stock price 
when investors behave rationally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 1b. The relation between managers’ private information revealed by the issue announcement and SEO stock price 
when investors behave less than rationally. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The relation between managers’ private information revealed at the issue 
announcement and SEO stock price 
 
This figure depicts the relation between managers’ private information revealed at the SEO announcement date and 
SEO stock price before and after the issue announcement for alternative types of investor behavior. Fig.1a shows the 
relation assuming investors act rationally and discount new information into stock price with no delay. Fig. 1b shows 
the relation when investors delay impounding managers’ private information revealed at the issue announcement into 
the stock price.  
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Table 1  
Previous evidence on the long-run performance of seasoned equity issuers 
This table reports mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns from previous studies on the long-run performance following seasoned equity issues. 
Country Study Sample size Holding period 
Sample 
period 
Mean buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (%) 
Australia Brown et al. (2010) 1828 3 years 1992–2006 −14.4% 
Canada Carpentier et al. (2010) 958 3 years 1993–2003 −53.3% 
France Jeanneret (2005) 232 3 years 1984–1998 −18.2% 
Germany Stehle et al. (2000) 584 3 years 1960–1992 −9.0% 
Japan Cai and Loughran (1998) 1389 5 years 1971–1992 −29.1% 
Spain Pastor-Llorca and Martin-Ugedo (2004) 44 3 years 1989–1996 −13.7% 
UK Levis (1995) 203 1.5 years 1980–1988 −18.5% 
US Loughran and Ritter (1995) 3702 5 years 1970–1990 −59.4% 
 Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 1247 5 years 1975–1989 −42.4% 
 Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 4439 3 years 1961–1993 −10.2% 
 Eckbo et al. (2000) 3315 5 years 1964–1995 −23.2% 
 Brav et al. (2000) 3775 5 years 1975–1992 −26.3% 
 Jegadeesh (2000) 2992 5 years 1970–1993 −34.3% 
 Ritter (2003)a 7760 5 years 1970–2000 −16.67% 
 Billett et al. (2011)b 2942 3 years 1983–2005 −9.6% 
a For Ritter (2003), five-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns are based on average annual returns in the five years after the issue for size-matched control firms.  
b
 For Billett et al. (2011), buy-and-hold abnormal returns are based on mean monthly abnormal returns from Fama–MacBeth regressions. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of SEOs over the sample period 1970–2004 
This table shows the distribution of 2,879 SEOs across NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks, three industry groups 
(Financial, Industrial and Utility), Fama and French size (Small, S, Medium, Me, Big, B) and B/M (High, H, Medium, 
M, Low, L) portfolios, issue period (1970–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2004), and as a percentage of the full 
sample. The sample includes US domiciled companies from CRSP, listed on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq at the time of the 
issue, that make offerings of pure primary shares or combinations of primary and equity sales by a major shareholder 
(combinations) in the US market. We include industrial, financial, and utility firms but exclude unit offerings and 
SEOs that simultaneously offer debt, preferred stock, or warrants. The sample excludes private placements, exchange 
offers of stock, 144A offers, cancelled offers, spin-off related issues, SEOs within a three-year period of an IPO, and 
equity offerings by the same company that occur within the three-year holding period of a prior equity offering. We 
retain offerings of common stock only (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) with stock return data available for at least a 
month after the issue and with non-missing CRSP/Compustat annual data for the conditional estimator of SEO 
abnormal returns for two fiscal years before the issue. We use only issuers and benchmark stocks with positive equity 
book values in the matching process.  
 
  
SEOs  % of the full sample 
Total 2879  
NYSE/AMEX 1341 46.58 
Nasdaq 1538 53.42 
Financial 127 4.41 
Industrial 2498 86.77 
Utility 254 8.82 
FF S–L 534 18.55 
FF S–M 511 17.75 
FF S–H 444 15.42 
FF Me–L 401 13.93 
FF Me–M 304 10.56 
FF Me–H 173 6.01 
FF B–L 213 7.40 
FF B–M 186 6.46 
FF B–H 113 3.92 
1970–1979 169 5.87 
1980–1989 578 20.08 
1990–1999 1048 36.40 
2000–2004 1084 37.65 
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Table 3 
Unconditional stock performance following seasoned equity offerings  
Panel A reports equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) buy-and-hold returns (in %) for 2,879 equity 
issuers (Issuer), size–B/M matched control firms (Match), and their difference (Diff) over a three-year post-issue 
period starting at the beginning of the first calendar month after the issue and finishing at the earlier of the three-
year anniversary or the delisting date. p is the p-value based on a skewness-adjusted t-statistic testing the 
hypothesis of no difference between average long-run performance of issuers and their matches. In calculating 
value weights we standardize market capitalization by the S&P 500 stock market index to ensure comparability 
over time. Panel B reports EW SEO and benchmark performance where we increase the holding period from 1 to 
36 months after the issue. 
Weight/Holding period Issuer (%) Match (%) Diff (%) p 
Panel A: Unconditional SEO performance for three years after the issue 
EW 14.94 40.81 −25.87 0.000 
VW 21.37 43.98 −22.60 0.000 
Panel B: EW long-run SEO performance as the holding period increases 
0–1 0.70 0.59 0.10 0.776 
0–2 −0.13 0.99 −1.12 0.022 
0–3 −0.14 1.84 −1.98 0.001 
0–4 −1.06 2.31 −3.36 0.000 
0–5 −1.64 3.26 −4.91 0.000 
0–6 −1.12 4.37 −5.50 0.000 
0–7 −1.09 5.47 −6.56 0.000 
0–8 −0.92 6.46 −7.38 0.000 
0–9 −0.91 7.42 −8.33 0.000 
0–10 −1.40 8.20 −9.60 0.000 
0–11 −1.55 9.19 −10.74 0.000 
0–12 −1.40 9.93 −11.33 0.000 
0–13 −1.57 11.49 −13.06 0.000 
0–14 −0.99 13.46 −14.45 0.000 
0–15 −0.86 14.51 −15.38 0.000 
0–16 −0.44 15.16 −15.60 0.000 
0–17 −0.10 16.50 −16.60 0.000 
0–18 0.84 17.46 −16.62 0.000 
0–19 1.76 18.69 −16.92 0.000 
0–20 1.60 19.80 −18.21 0.000 
0–21 2.68 21.37 −18.69 0.000 
0–22 3.21 22.27 −19.06 0.000 
0–23 3.72 23.50 −19.78 0.000 
0–24 3.80 25.14 −21.34 0.000 
0–25 4.39 26.38 −21.99 0.000 
0–26 5.16 27.54 −22.38 0.000 
0–27 5.80 29.40 −23.61 0.000 
0–28 7.06 29.96 −22.90 0.000 
0–29 8.16 30.81 −22.65 0.000 
0–30 9.63 32.57 −22.94 0.000 
0–31 10.44 33.92 −23.48 0.000 
0–32 10.77 35.43 −24.67 0.000 
0–33 11.56 36.71 −25.16 0.000 
0–34 12.64 38.26 −25.62 0.000 
0–35 13.99 39.28 −25.29 0.000 
0–36 14.94 40.81 −25.87 0.000 
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Table 4 
Regressions of buy-and-hold returns on pre-event firm and market characteristics 
Panel A reports regression estimates (Estimate) for equations (1) and (2) where the dependent variable is the three-
year buy-and-hold return of SEOs or their matches. The explanatory variables are book-to-market (B/M), total market 
capitalization in $m deflated by the S&P 500 market index (MV), Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure (LM12), and leverage 
(LEV), all in log form, investment-to-assets (INV/A), return on assets (ROA) and pre-issue abnormal return 
performance (pAB). MV, LM12 and pAB are measured one month before the issue. B/M, LEV, ROA and INV/A are for 
the prior fiscal year-end at least six months before the issue and, together with LM12, are winsorized based on the 
CRSP population at 1%. SE denotes year- and industry-clustered standard errors and p the p-value. N is the number 
of observations, F  and P> F  are the F- and corresponding p-values for model specification and Adj R2 is the adjusted 
R-square. Panel B shows the difference in coefficients between SEOs and control stocks (Beta diff) and mean firm 
characteristics for SEOs (X SEO), matches (X matches) and their difference (X diff). Average firm characteristics are 
over a 3-year post-issue holding period. SE denotes year- and industry-clustered standard errors and p is a p-value for 
the significance of the differences.  
 
Panel A: Regression estimates for equations (1) and (2)       
 SEOs  Matches 
  Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Intercept 0.436 0.065 0.000 0.618 0.051 0.000 
ln B/M 0.092 0.039 0.017 0.189 0.018 0.000 
ln MV 0.028 0.011 0.013 −0.018 0.023 0.431 
ln LM12 −0.003 0.004 0.378 −0.011 0.005 0.028 
ln LEV 0.145 0.022 0.000 0.131 0.039 0.001 
INV/A −0.402 0.076 0.000 −0.359 0.124 0.004 
ROA 0.329 0.100 0.001 0.633 0.115 0.000 
pAB −0.094 0.024 0.000 −0.002 0.072 0.973 
 
      
N 2879      
F 26.370 
 
 F 25.840 
 
P >  F 0.000 
 
 P >  F 0.000 
 
Adj R2 3.44%     Adj R2 4.03%   
 
Panel B: Differences in coefficients and firm characteristics 
 
Coefficient differences  Variable means  Characteristic differences 
  Beta diff SE p X SEO X matches  X diff SE p 
Intercept −0.182 0.082 0.027      
ln B/M −0.097 0.043 0.023 −0.699 −0.723 0.024 0.011 0.020 
ln MV 0.046 0.026 0.071 −0.596 −0.795 0.199 0.011 0.000 
ln LM12 0.008 0.006 0.229 −7.685 −6.071 −1.614 0.062 0.000 
ln LEV 0.014 0.044 0.744 −0.905 −0.875 −0.030 0.012 0.015 
INV/A −0.043 0.145 0.768 0.125 0.078 0.047 0.004 0.000 
ROA −0.304 0.152 0.046 −0.022 0.018 −0.040 0.003 0.000 
pAB −0.091 0.076 0.231           
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 5 
Variables relating to the equity issue decision 
Panel A reports means (Mean), standard deviations (STD) and medians (Median) of the variables that relate to the equity issue decision or control for risk 
for SEOs, matches, and the remaining CRSP stocks. Column Diff S–M (Diff S–C) reports differences in characteristics between SEOs and their control firms 
(SEOs and the remaining CRSP stocks). p is a p-value for differences. Runup is the previous 6-month buy-and-hold % return, MKT return is the previous 
six-month buy-and-hold return on the CRSP VW NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index in %, and Nasdaq equals 1 if the stock is listed on Nasdaq and zero otherwise. 
Hot equals 1 if the number of SEOs in a month preceding the issue is above the median monthly number of SEOs over the previous 36 months and zero 
otherwise. MV is market value of common equity in $m deflated by the S&P 500 market index, B/M is the B/M ratio, INV/A is the change in property plant 
and equipment plus the annual change in inventories scaled by lagged value of assets, Age is the number of years between the issue date and the firm’s first 
CRSP listing date, EG is the current year’s earnings growth in %, IFC is the inverse of internal funding (CAPEX/change in retained earnings plus depreciation 
and amortization), ROA is return on assets in %, LEV is the ratio of firm total liabilities to total assets, and LM12 is Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure. Accounting 
variables (B/M, INV/A, EG, IFC, ROA and LEV) are for the prior fiscal year-end at least six months before the issue and, together with LM12, winsorize 
them based on the CRSP population at 1%. Market variables are measured one month before the issue. Panel B shows the Pearson correlation coefficients 
between the variables with p-values beneath. N is the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the sample of SEOs, matches and remaining CRSP stocks 
 SEOs  Matches  CRSP stocks    
 (N = 2879) (N = 2879) (N = 21101) SEOs − Matches  SEO − CRSP 
  
 Mean STD Median Mean STD Median Mean STD Median Diff S − M p Diff S − C p 
Runup (%) 39.63 79.40 23.38 15.26 44.30 9.73 6.66 45.88 1.54 24.370 0.000 32.970 0.000 
MKT return (%) 9.28 11.46 10.33 9.28 11.46 10.33 6.07 11.74 6.70 0.000 1.000 3.220 0.000 
Nasdaq 0.534 0.499 1.000 0.494 0.500 0.000 0.458 0.498 0.000 0.040 0.002 0.076 0.000 
Hot 0.803 0.398 1.000 0.803 0.398 1.000 0.527 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.276 0.000 
MV 2.913 16.207 0.455 2.717 16.484 0.368 2.627 11.973 0.242 0.196 0.649 0.287 0.359 
B/M 0.664 0.595 0.505 0.660 0.581 0.505 0.858 0.752 0.662 0.004 0.799 −0.194 0.000 
INV/A 0.133 0.208 0.084 0.087 0.168 0.054 0.101 0.188 0.066 0.046 0.000 0.031 0.000 
Age 11.492 9.167 8.504 14.011 9.621 11.459 12.084 8.913 9.910 −2.520 0.000 −0.592 0.001 
EG (%) 10.86 184.82 14.59 5.94 144.01 8.94 3.69 164.58 8.91 4.920 0.259 7.170 0.048 
IFC −25.395 124.291 1.613 −9.158 107.624 4.147 −4.611 95.488 3.607 −16.237 0.000 −20.784 0.000 
ROA (%) −4.81 23.28 3.36 0.99 17.66 4.60 −0.12 17.32 3.93 −5.790 0.000 −4.690 0.000 
LEV 0.502 0.216 0.531 0.477 0.218 0.486 0.491 0.209 0.503 0.025 0.000 0.010 0.015 
LM12 4.812 15.871 0.000 8.467 24.730 0.000 17.336 37.495 0.000 −3.655 0.000 −12.524 0.000 
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Table 5  
Continued. 
Panel B: Pearson correlations between probit model explanatory variables           
  Runup MKT return ln MV ln B/M INV/A ln Age EG IFC ROA ln LEV 
MKT return 0.300          
 
0.000          
ln MV 0.110 0.048         
 
0.000 0.000         
ln B/M 0.060 0.013 −0.142        
 
0.000 0.029 0.000        
INV/A −0.031 0.047 0.066 −0.126       
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000       
ln Age 0.001 0.008 0.304 0.168 −0.195      
 
0.866 0.189 0.000 0.000 0.000      
EG 0.005 0.022 0.094 −0.039 0.109 0.001     
 
0.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.876     
IFC −0.050 0.008 0.149 0.174 0.068 0.098 0.029    
 
0.000 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
ROA −0.024 0.026 0.304 0.175 0.125 0.203 0.076 0.407   
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
ln LEV −0.010 0.019 0.142 0.094 0.045 0.207 0.005 0.104 0.075  
 
0.106 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.000  
ln LM12 −0.016 0.004 −0.602 0.276 −0.071 −0.135 −0.059 0.019 −0.019 −0.011 
  
0.008 0.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.079 
 
 
     Table 6 
Probability of an equity issue 
Panel A reports probit estimates (Estimate) of a model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for firms making an SEO in a year and 0 otherwise. pAB is the difference between the firm’s and the market’s prior 
six-month buy-and-hold return, Nasdaq equals 1 if the stock lists on Nasdaq and 0 otherwise. Hot equals 1 if the 
number of SEOs in a month preceding the issue is above the median monthly number of SEOs over the previous 36 
months and zero otherwise. MV is the market value of common equity in $m deflated by the S&P 500 market index, 
B/M is the B/M ratio, INV/A is the change in property plant and equipment plus the annual change in inventories 
scaled by lagged value of assets, Age is the number of years between the issue date and the firm’s first CRSP listing 
date, EG is the current year’s earnings growth, IFC measures the inverse of internal funding (CAPEX/ change in 
retained earnings plus depreciation and amortization), ROA is return on assets, LEV is the ratio of firm total liabilities 
to total assets, and LM12 is Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure. The model includes issue month, year and industry 
dummies using definitions from Kenneth French’s webpage. Accounting variables (B/M, INV/A, EG, IFC, ROA and 
LEV) are for the prior fiscal year-end allowing for a six month reporting gap and, together with LM12, are winsorized 
based on the CRSP population at 1%. Market variables (pAB, Hot, MV, and LM12) are measured one month before 
the issue. Pred sign shows the predicted direction of the relation. SE denotes standard errors, and p the p-value based 
on z-statistics. Column ME measures the percentage marginal effects for a unit change in the explanatory variables. 
Panel B shows the model mean predicted probability of equity issue for CRSP stocks, the sample of SEOs, and their 
matches. 
 
Panel A: Estimates of the probability of equity issue 
    
  Pred.sign Estimate ME (%) SE p 
Intercept  −0.869  0.088 0.000 
pAB + 0.450 6.40 0.020 0.000 
Nasdaq + 0.102 1.45 0.031 0.001 
Hot + 0.380 5.19 0.033 0.000 
ln MV − 0.084 1.19 0.009 0.000 
ln B/M − −0.068 −0.97 0.015 0.000 
INV/A + 0.511 7.27 0.059 0.000 
ln Age − −0.105 −1.49 0.016 0.000 
EG − 0.004 0.06 0.007 0.552 
IFC − 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.198 
ROA − −0.440 −6.25 0.066 0.000 
ln LEV + 0.103 1.47 0.022 0.000 
ln LM12 − −0.013 −0.18 0.003 0.000 
Issue month dummies Not reported 
Year dummies Not reported 
Industry dummies Not reported 
Number of event observations 2879     
Number of non-event observations 23980     
χ2 2607     
p-value 0.000     
Pseudo R2 14.24%     
 
Panel B: Predicted probability of equity issue    
 N Mean (%) SE p 
SEOs predicted probability 2879 20.14 0.003 0.000 
Matches predicted probability 2879 13.91 0.002 0.000 
CRSP predicted probability 21101 8.92 0.001 0.000 
SEOs − Matches 2879 6.22 0.002 0.000 
  
  
Table 7 
Regressions of buy-and-hold returns with private information adjustment 
Panel A reports regression estimates (Estimate) for equations (7) and (8), where the dependent variable is the SEO’s 
or the match’s three-year buy-and-hold return. The explanatory variables are the B/M ratio (B/M), total market 
capitalization in $m deflated by the S&P 500 market index (MV), Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure (LM12), leverage 
(LEV), all in log form, investment-to-assets (INV/A), return on assets (ROA) and pre-issue abnormal performance 
(pAB). MV, LM12 and pAB are measured one month before the issue. B/M, LEV, INV/A and ROA are for the prior 
fiscal year-end at least six months before the issue and, together with LM12, are winsorized based on the CRSP 
population at 1%. 0 1,     are the inverse Mills ratios from the equity issue model, proxying for managerial private 
information revealed by the issue announcement. SE denotes asymptotically consistent standard errors, and p gives 
the corresponding p-values. N is the number of observations, F  and P> F  are the F- and corresponding p-values for 
model specification, Adj R2 is the adjusted R-square, rho is the correlation between the residuals in the issue selection 
equation (4) and unconditional expected post-issue returns for SEOs/matches (equations 1 and 2). Sigma  is the 
standard error of residuals for the expected returns equations (1) and (2). Panel B reports mean lambda and Pearson 
correlation coefficients between lambda and other explanatory variables. Panel C shows the difference in coefficients 
between SEOs and control stocks (Beta diff). SE stands for standard errors and p is a p-value for the significance of 
the differences. 
 
Panel A: Conditional issue effect  
 
SEOs  Matches 
  
Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Intercept 0.724 0.140 0.000 0.576 0.062 0.000 
ln B/M 0.096 0.023 0.000 0.194 0.025 0.000 
ln MV 0.024 0.014 0.090 −0.019 0.015 0.182 
ln LM12 0.000 0.005 0.995 −0.009 0.005 0.072 
ln LEV 0.139 0.035 0.000 0.127 0.036 0.000 
INV/A −0.463 0.102 0.000 −0.391 0.130 0.003 
ROA 0.420 0.107 0.000 0.687 0.136 0.000 
pAB −0.145 0.038 0.000 −0.053 0.066 0.419 
1  −0.165 0.075 0.028    
0     −0.231 0.192 0.231 
N 2879 
 
    
F 14.310   F 16.170  
P >  F 0.000 
 
 P >  F 0.000  
Adj R2 3.56%   Adj R2 4.04%  
rho    −0.154   rho    −0.204  
Sigma   1.073     Sigma   1.131   
 
Panel B: Mean lambda and Pearson correlations between lambda and explanatory variables 
 Mean lambda ln B/M ln MV ln LM12 ln LEV INV/A ROA pAB 
1  1.485 0.125 −0.149 0.331 0.038 −0.135 0.302 −0.523 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0  −0.252 0.152 −0.187 0.333 −0.053 −0.119 0.284 −0.572 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel C: Differences in regression coefficients  
 Intercept ln B/M ln MV ln LM12 ln LEV INV/A ROA pAB 
Beta diff 0.149 −0.098 0.043 0.009 0.011 −0.072 −0.267 −0.092 
SE 0.153 0.034 0.020 0.007 0.050 0.165 0.173 0.076 
p 0.332 0.004 0.033 0.199 0.820 0.662 0.123 0.228 
  
 Table 8 
Sensitivity analysis 
Panel A reports regression estimates (Estimate) for SEOs split into High and Low groups based on pre-issue abnormal 
performance (pAB). The dependent variable is the SEO’s three-year buy-and-hold return. The explanatory variables 
are the B/M ratio (B/M), total market capitalization in $m deflated by the S&P 500 market index (MV), Liu’s (2006) 
liquidity measure (LM12), leverage (LEV), all in log form, investment-to-assets (INV/A), return on assets (ROA) and 
pre-issue abnormal performance (pAB). MV, LM12 and pAB are measured one month before the issue. B/M, LEV, ROA 
and INV/A are for the prior fiscal year-end at least six months before the issue and, together with LM12, are winsorized 
based on the CRSP population at 1%. 1  is the inverse Mills ratio from the equity issue model, proxying for managerial 
private information. SE denotes asymptotically consistent standard errors and p is the p-value. N is the number of 
observations, F  and P> F  are the F- and corresponding p-values for model specification, Adj R2 is the adjusted R-square, 
rho is the correlation between residuals in the issue selection equation (4) and unconditional expected post-issue returns 
for SEOs. Sigma  is the standard error of the residuals for unconditional SEO expected returns. Panel B shows regression 
estimates for SEOs made during high (Hot) and low (Cold) issue volume months, where an issue month is Hot (Cold) 
if the number of sample SEOs in a month preceding the issue is above (below) the median monthly number of sample 
SEOs over the previous 36 months. 
 
Panel A: Grouping SEOs by pre-issue abnormal performance  
 
High pAB  Low pAB 
 
Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Intercept 0.874 0.194 0.000 0.640 0.215 0.003 
ln B/M 0.104 0.029 0.000 0.069 0.037 0.060 
ln MV 0.016 0.020 0.416 0.011 0.022 0.633 
ln LM12 0.001 0.006 0.850 −0.006 0.008 0.417 
ln LEV 0.148 0.042 0.000 0.124 0.058 0.031 
INV/A −0.529 0.130 0.000 −0.407 0.154 0.009 
ROA 0.498 0.129 0.000 0.272 0.167 0.103 
pAB −0.209 0.054 0.000 0.460 0.192 0.017 
1  −0.194 0.089 0.030 −0.124 0.105 0.236 
 
      
N 1439   N 1440  
F 11.030   F 5.700  
P >  F 0.000   P >  F 0.000  
Adj R2 5.28%   Adj R2 2.54%  
rho    −0.206   rho    −0.105  
Sigma   0.940   Sigma   1.187  
Mean pAB 70.59%   Mean pAB −10.01%  
Median pAB 45.85%     Median pAB −4.98%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Panel B: SEOs in hot and cold issuing periods 
 
Hot  Cold 
  
Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Intercept 1.096 0.178 0.000 1.356 0.475 0.005 
ln B/M 0.118 0.024 0.000 0.076 0.073 0.303 
ln MV 0.025 0.015 0.092 −0.034 0.042 0.416 
ln LM12 0.006 0.005 0.258 −0.008 0.013 0.547 
ln LEV 0.125 0.036 0.001 0.152 0.102 0.135 
INV/A −0.495 0.110 0.000 −0.870 0.297 0.004 
ROA 0.491 0.116 0.000 0.722 0.329 0.029 
pAB −0.221 0.044 0.000 −0.175 0.111 0.116 
1  −0.403 0.101 0.000 −0.440 0.433 0.310 
 
      
N 2311   N 568  
F 14.970   F 2.480  
P >  F 0.000   P >  F 0.012  
Adj R2 4.61%   Adj R2 2.06%  
rho    −0.391   rho    −0.310  
Sigma   1.032     Sigma   1.421   
 
 
  
Table 8  
Continued. 
 Table 9 
Sensitivity analysis: empirical model specification 
This table reports regression estimates (Estimate) for a random sample of non-issuing CRSP stocks from the equity 
issue decision in Table 6 and three random subsamples of 5,000 stocks. There are 20,783 non-issuing stocks 
(excluding size–B/M benchmark stocks) with non-missing returns. The dependent variable is the non-issuer’s three-
year buy-and-hold return. The explanatory variables are the B/M ratio (B/M), total market capitalization in $m 
deflated by the S&P 500 market index (MV), Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure (LM12), leverage (LEV), all in log form, 
investment-to-assets (INV/A), return on assets (ROA) and pre-issue abnormal performance (pAB). MV, LM12 and pAB 
are measured one month before the issue. B/M, LEV, ROA and INV/A are for the prior fiscal year-end at least six 
months before the issue and, together with LM12, are winsorized based on the CRSP population at 1%. 0 is the 
inverse Mills ratio from the equity issue model, proxying for managerial private information. p is the p-value based 
on asymptotically consistent standard errors. N is the number of observations, F  and P> F  are the F- and corresponding 
p-values for model specification, Adj R2 is the adjusted R-square, rho is the correlation between residuals in the issue 
selection equation (4) and unconditional expected post-event returns for non-issuing stocks. Sigma  is the standard 
error of residuals for unconditional expected returns. 
 
 All non-issuers  Random sample 1  Random sample 2  Random sample 3 
  
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.646 0.000 0.610 0.000 0.633 0.000 0.604 0.000 
ln B/M 0.148 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.174 0.000 
ln MV −0.008 0.275 0.015 0.013 0.001 0.915 −0.006 0.389 
ln LM12 0.000 0.943 0.006 0.003 −0.002 0.482 0.000 0.924 
ln LEV 0.066 0.001 0.000 0.993 0.102 0.000 −0.003 0.864 
INV/A −0.241 0.000 −0.295 0.000 −0.052 0.375 −0.289 0.000 
ROA 0.289 0.000 0.436 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.314 0.000 
pAB −0.013 0.685 −0.017 0.529 −0.038 0.199 −0.049 0.095 
0  0.120 0.269 0.132 0.135 −0.027 0.783 0.072 0.460 
 
      
  
N 20783  5000  5000  5000  
F 29.400 
 
10.470 
 
10.060  10.470 
 
P >  F 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000  0.000 
 
Adj R2 1.08% 
 
1.49% 
 
1.43%  1.49% 
 
rho    0.073 
 
0.099 
 
−0.018  0.049 
 
Sigma   1.630 
  
1.328 
  
1.485   1.467 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 10 
The speed of correction to private information 
This table reports lambda estimates (Lambda estimate), where the start date for measuring post-issue SEO buy-and-
hold returns increases by one month, holding the period end fixed at month 36 after the issue. Lambda is the inverse 
Mills ratio, based on the equity issue model in Table 6, and proxies for the magnitude of pre-event information 
asymmetry. The dependent variable is the SEO’s three-year buy-and-hold return. The explanatory variables (not 
reported here) are the B/M ratio (B/M), total market capitalization in $m deflated by the S&P 500 market index (MV), 
Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure (LM12), leverage (LEV), all in log form, investment-to-assets (INV/A), return on assets 
(ROA) and pre-issue abnormal performance (pAB). MV, LM12 and pAB are for one month before the event date. B/M, 
LEV, ROA and INV/A are for the prior fiscal year-end at least six months before the offering date and, together with 
LM12, are winsorized based on the CRSP population at 1%. Period shows the buy-and-hold returns holding period 
and N is the number of observations. SE and p are the asymptotic standard errors and associated p-values.  
 
Period N Lambda estimate SE p 
0–36 2879 −0.165 0.075 0.028 
1–36 2834 −0.199 0.074 0.008 
2–36 2822 −0.190 0.073 0.010 
3–36 2808 −0.207 0.075 0.006 
4–36 2790 −0.225 0.075 0.003 
5–36 2783 −0.241 0.074 0.001 
6–36 2774 −0.206 0.068 0.002 
7–36 2755 −0.198 0.069 0.004 
8–36 2729 −0.183 0.065 0.005 
9–36 2717 −0.187 0.067 0.005 
10–36 2701 −0.184 0.070 0.008 
11–36 2679 −0.186 0.070 0.008 
12–36 2661 −0.156 0.069 0.024 
13–36 2635 −0.153 0.067 0.022 
14–36 2630 −0.152 0.063 0.016 
15–36 2615 −0.149 0.064 0.020 
16–36 2600 −0.115 0.061 0.058 
17–36 2584 −0.095 0.063 0.128 
18–36 2570 −0.062 0.062 0.319 
19–36 2542 −0.029 0.059 0.621 
20–36 2534 −0.013 0.061 0.835 
21–36 2515 −0.013 0.057 0.823 
22–36 2495 −0.026 0.055 0.639 
23–36 2482 −0.020 0.055 0.712 
24–36 2466 −0.025 0.051 0.626 
25–36 2453 −0.019 0.050 0.709 
26–36 2431 −0.031 0.045 0.488 
27–36 2418 −0.033 0.043 0.441 
28–36 2400 −0.025 0.038 0.513 
29–36 2385 −0.026 0.037 0.480 
30–36 2369 −0.029 0.037 0.432 
31–36 2356 −0.028 0.035 0.415 
32–36 2345 −0.035 0.025 0.155 
33–36 2330 −0.011 0.021 0.598 
34–36 2324 −0.005 0.017 0.766 
35–36 2310 −0.020 0.013 0.147 
 
